National ICT-Driven Development Policy Comparing Approaches in India and China by Bajpai, Nirupam et al.
CSD Working Paper Series: Towards a New Indian Model of Information and Communications 










National ICT-Driven Development Policy 
Comparing Approaches in India and China 
 
















Prior to 1991, India was mired in economic stagnation related to a bloated public sector, 
opaque business regulations and an inefficient industrialization policy based on import 
substitution. To avert an incipient foreign exchange crisis, the government introduced a raft 
of liberal reforms including reduced import taxes, market deregulation, and incentives for 
foreign investment. These reforms have largely been responsible for the consistently high 
GDP growth India has experienced since 1991, driven by entry of foreign capital and 
advancements in the services sector. However, the wealthy have been the greatest 
beneficiaries of this growth, as earnings inequality between the top and bottom 10% of the 
population doubled between 1991 and 2013.  
 
ICT has been the largest enabler of this rapid growth by making India’s comparative 
advantage in the service sector accessible to the global economy. India has grown into a giant 
in the global services outsourcing industry, and concurrent increases in digital talent have 
propelled India’s information technology industry into becoming a major player both 
domestically and abroad. 
 
China experienced a similar trajectory, as economic opening and reform over the period from 
1978 to 1989 was followed by ambitious government promotion of specific cities as global 
manufacturing hubs. Low labor costs and business-friendly policies within Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) attracted initial foreign investments, snowballing as the region developed into a 
manufacturing hub. As skill in the manufacturing sector increased, particularly in the 
hardware and electronics industries, China has risen up the value chain to develop 
increasingly complex components indigenously. National economic planners now prioritize 
high-tech manufacturing, and the rise of China’s gigantic tech companies has powered a 
simultaneous rise in the country’s service industry. Incipient public investments are now 
targeting development and applications of Artificial Intelligence, which stands both to further 
elevate the manufacturing sector and place China at the center of future global economic 
developments. 
 
ICT, as a set of tools that can integrate users into the national economy while democratizing 
service delivery, provides an excellent toolkit to promote the inclusive growth that 
liberalization has not yet delivered in either economy. To do so, however, national policies to 
encourage ICT-led growth and development must be put in place. While China has largely 
made successful infrastructure investments to encourage digitization across the country, India 
continues to lag in certain key measures. In contrast, while India has introduced specific 
strategies to leverage AI as an engine of inclusive growth, China’s AI development strategy 
prioritizes achieving a dominant position in the global market over using AI domestically as 
an engine of broad-based development.   
 
Moving forward, India should draw lessons from China’s success in implementing strategic 
federal initiatives and developing local capacity to expand the public sector’s capacity to 
support ICT-driven development. In addition, India should recognize the need to develop 
enhanced research capacity as ICT, especially AI, makes increasingly essential contributions 
to the economy. For its part, China should make targeted investments in ICT-driven 
development for sectors likely to lag behind. It should also clarify the tension between its 





Trends in India 
 
 
After economic reforms in the early 1990s, India has consistently seen moderately high levels 
of growth, never dropping below 3.8% per year. Additional reforms could push annual 
growth as high as 10% on a regular basis. However, ensuring inclusive growth remains a 
concern. 
 
In 1991, India found itself in an economic crisis. A longstanding policy of import substitution 
industrialization, combined with a large, persistently growing public sector and complicated 
business regulations which conspired to depress private domestic and foreign investment, had 
led to high levels of combined trade and fiscal deficit. As falling exports forced the country to 
rely on foreign reserves to meet international debt obligations, the Reserve Bank of India’s 
reluctance to permit devaluation of the Rupee caused the country’s foreign exchange reserves 
to rapidly deplete, to the point where India could only finance three weeks of essential 
imports. 
 
Following emergency measures to avert the crisis, the Indian Government introduced a 
program of liberalization that included reduced import taxes, market deregulation, increased 
incentives for foreign investment, and lower taxes. These reforms have been seen as largely 
responsible for India’s high growth rates since 1991. After reaching a low of 1.06% in 1991, 
GDP growth has not since dropped below 4%, averaging nearly 7% and reaching a high of 
10.3% in 2010 (World Bank). Former RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan has argued that with 
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additional reforms, particularly regarding land acquisition, India could reach 10% annual 
growth.1 
 
Foreign capital has played a vital role in this growth, as looser regulation made India a more 
inviting environment not only for international businesses to expand their Asian footprint, but 
to also set up more permanent, domestic divisions. With English as one of its two official 
languages, and high numbers of graduates in STEM sectors, India has become recognized for 
its comparative advantage in service provision, particularly in the telecommunications sector. 
Outsourcing alone has become a $150 billion industry with growth projected at 10% in 2016-
17.2 The sector now employs 3.5 million people and represents 9.5% of India’s GDP. With 
anticipated crackdowns on the International Entrepreneur and H-1B visa programs in the 
United States, Indian outsourcers may experience an influx of highly educated talent that 




China’s growth was initially driven by high levels of foreign direct investment, but FDI has 
fallen as a share of overall GDP as domestic firms have gained traction and GDP has 
increased. FDI in India has risen both in raw terms and as a share of GDP as India 
increasingly becomes a global services hub. 
 







However, economic liberalization has not yielded inclusive growth. What growth has 
occurred has largely resulted from increased consumption by the wealthy, with earnings 
inequality between the top and bottom 10% doubling between 1991 and 2013.4 India’s top 
1% now hold a greater share of national wealth than anywhere else besides Russia, standing 
at 58.4% as of November 2016. According to an OECD survey, better delivery of 
infrastructure, education, and basic services, particularly in rural areas, would lead to reduced 
poverty and greater creation of employment.5 ICT provides a superb toolkit for doing this in 
such a way that it both reaches far-flung populations and helps integrate them into the future 
of India’s service-driven economy. Digitally-enabled tools can not only allow new groups of 
people to participate in the formal economy and take part in the benefits therein, they can 
enable service delivery and verification for groups never reached before. 
 
 
Services have taken over the dominant role in the Indian economy as agriculture, once the 
economy’s backbone, has declined in importance. Manufacturing experienced a surge in the 
mid-2000s, but since then, India’s comparative advantage in services has caused this sector 
to reassert itself. Besides, manufacturing has not taken off in India, as it did in China in the 
1980s and the 90s due to lack of reforms in the areas of labor laws; land laws; exit policy; 
small-scale industry product reservation; unavailability of the required physical 
infrastructure and significantly underperforming SEZs. 






Trends in China 
 
The People’s Republic of China was founded following over 20 years of fierce civil war in 
1949, two years after India gained its independence. In the following four decades, both 
countries followed almost identical growth trajectories, with GDP (PPP) per capita standing 
at roughly 1200 USD in both countries as late as 1992. Since then, however, China has 
experienced rapid exponential growth that India has not matched. The story of this growth 
relates to judicious policy reforms creating an opening for growth, fortuitous timing allowing 
China to find a dominant niche in the global economy, and forward-looking governance 
offering future opportunities for economic development. 
 
The foundations of the modern Chinese economy were laid following the death of Mao 
Zedong under the chairmanship of Deng Xiaoping from 1978 to 1989. Under Deng, China’s 
first Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were introduced, with the small fishing village of 
Shenzhen as the flagship. These SEZs created space for Chinese companies to experiment 
with market capitalism and international trade under the auspices of reduced taxes and tariffs, 
looser regulations, and depreciation of the RMB. As a result, domestic companies rapidly 
expanded their production capacity in consumer electronics, and as supply exceeded demand, 
began to explore overseas markets. This has enormous growth implications for the cities at 
the vanguard of this movement - Shenzhen, for example, grew at an average rate of 40% 
between 1981 and 1993. 
 
 
Opening and reform drove exponential growth in the Chinese economy, peaking in a boom 
decade from 2002-2011 during which growth never fell below 9%. With China having 
solidified its middle-income status, growth has since slowed as the country prepares for a 
transition from extensive to intensive growth, from adoption to innovation, and from a 
manufacturing-driven to a services-driven economy. 
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SEZs like Shenzhen also sparked the development of industrial clusters that served as proofs 
of concept for potential foreign investors. After Deng’s “Southern Tour” in 1992, in which he 
advocated for entrepreneurship and open economic policies throughout the Pearl River Delta 
and Shanghai, FDI truly took off. Electronics led the way, with 60-70% of foreign investment 
in this sector, and as new technology was shared, product quality improved and higher-value 
Chinese exports became more internationally competitive. 
 
China today has become a manufacturing superpower. With the transition from a rigorously 
planned economy into a looser system of state-driven capitalism, rapid increases in foreign 
investment have allowed China to use its low cost of labor to create a strong comparative 
advantage in the sector. As a result, China’s economy has grown at an average rate of 9.12% 
over the past two decades, with industry and manufacturing contributing the greatest value 
added to GDP through 2012. The “world’s factory” continues to revolve around its SEZs, 
which continue to be centers of FDI, new ventures and export processing. Modern Shenzhen 
alone has grown into a city of 13 million. 
 
Since 2012, increased economic development and a more educated populace has caused 
China’s economy to start undergoing a new transition. While these developments have 
caused China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing to decrease, the service sector’s 
contribution to GDP has experienced steady increases. The development of the Chinese 
service sector has largely been led by advancements in the ICT sector, as a growing domestic 
market and protectionist policies have allowed Chinese internet companies to rapidly grow 
into some of the largest in the world. As of 2018, Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu have attained 
market caps of 580 billion, 542 billion, and 99 billion USD, good for 3rd, 5th, and 8th in the 
world. These companies have reached these milestones despite catering almost exclusively to 
a domestic customer base. With the Chinese government frequently requiring technology 
transfer and joint ventures with domestic firms as a prerequisite for foreign companies 
wishing to enter the vast Chinese market, the knowledge transfer driving this transition seem 




Prior to 2012, manufacturing represented the largest slice of China’s GDP. This was 
followed closely by services, many of which were engaged in supporting the manufacturing 
sector. Since 2012, with the rise of China’s large technology and internet companies, services 
have taken over the top spot in place of manufacturing. 
 
ICT and Sectoral Specialization 
 
Software and services in India 
 
The service sector does not simply represent the largest section of the Indian economy. It also 
comprises the fastest growing services sector in the world and accounts for 28% of all 
employment in the country.6 The source of this growth has been India’s innate comparative 
advantage as a global services provider, thanks to the English language, low costs of labor, 
and a market feedback mechanism that successfully encouraged graduates to specialize in 
industries where the rise of global communications technology would provide them 
opportunities for future work. 
 
India first emerged as a hub for outsourcing in the early 1990s, during which the air travel 
and IT industries realized that rapidly decreasing costs of communication meant they could 
not only send much of their back-office work to be completed abroad at lower expense, but 
also that India’s geographical location would also allow much of this work to be completed 
while main offices were closed for business, improving business efficiency. Since this early 




stage, industrial clustering has eventually allowed India to emerge as a global hub for 
software and IT services (Bajpai et.al., 2004)7. Today, India is responsible for 55% of the 190 
billion USD global services sourcing industry, while maintaining 60-70% cost savings on 
average over source countries.8 This competitive cost advantage is expected to increase as the 
rupee weakens, freeing up more cash for these companies to undertake more innovative 
research.9 
 
In recent years, India has also succeeded in moving up the value chain of IT-enabled Services 
(IteS). With 75% of global digital talent, India has grown into a source of digital innovation 
and a wellspring of intellectual capital itself, and several international IT firms have decided 
to place their own innovation centers in India. The 167 billion information technology 
industry in India has increasingly looked for domestic business opportunities as information 
technology plays a greater role in the lives of Indians, and spending on IT within India is 
expected to have grown 9% through 2018 to reach 87.1 billion USD. Through 2019, the IT 
sector is expected to continue growing at a 7-9% rate, albeit with close to neutral job creation 
as technology jobs migrate to non-technology focused companies.10 
 
While FDI slumped in 2017-2018 as the result of interest rate hikes by the United States 
Federal Reserve, FDI overall has trended upwards as India’s comparative strengths continue 
to attract foreign companies.11 As leading companies such as Infosys, Wipro, and Tech 
Mahindra develop indigenous blockchain and artificial intelligence solutions to solve clients’ 
problems, NASSCOM, India’s IT-BPM trade association, has launched an online platform 
intended to up-skill two million professionals and an additional two million students. 
Alongside this private investment in sustaining India’s human capital advantage in the 
services sector, the government has also announced initiatives to champion the IT sector, 
introducing a strategic plan to transform India not just into a hub for ICT services, but also 
into a hub for artificial intelligence research, implementation of AI solutions to societal 
problems, and an exporter of AI-enabled services tested at scale to other developing 
countries. 
 
Hardware and smart manufacturing development in China 
 
Electronics manufacturing has made up a core component of China’s economic development 
strategy since the Reform and Opening period. Since then, national economic planners have 
increasingly promoted entry into high-tech manufacturing and the development of a long-
term ICT manufacturing and development strategy. However, despite China’s modern 
position as a major exporter of consumer electronics, the country’s role in electronics 
manufacturing has historically been limited to assembling completed components. Even 
major manufacturers like Lenovo, the world’s largest PC vendor and sixth largest hardware 
company, have traditionally relied on chips provided by foreign companies such as IBM.  
 
China’s first ICT development strategy was issued by the State Council in 1984. It indicated 
that the electronics manufacturing industry should focus on microelectronics, particularly 









computers and communications equipment, and that services in the electronics and 
information sectors should focus on supporting cluster development for this industry. By 
1997, China had developed its first strategy for “informatization,” or integrating information 
technology into national economic development. The resulting “2010 Vision,” as part of the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan, called for state-led unified standards in ICT, interconnection, and 
resource sharing. The Tenth Five-Year Plan, published 2001, built on this by proposing 
incorporating information technology into industrialization strategy. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NRDC), China’s chief macroeconomic planning 
agency, would introduce the first “Informatization special plan” later that year.  
 
An information technology strategy was fully integrated into national economic planning by 
2006, when the National Informatization Development Strategy was published. This 
document remains in force as China’s active long-term ICT development strategic framework 
through 2020. Over this time period, China intends to become a leader in “smart 
manufacturing” through ICT integration into modern factories and even AI-assisted 
processes. 
 
Following these policy initiatives, China has worked to scale up from simple assembly to 
indigenous hardware design and development. Chief among these initiatives is “Made in 
China 2025,” which aims to transform China into an innovation-powered leader in 
technologies that will drive future economies such as AI. With regards to manufacturing, the 
plan encouraged the whole sector to produce higher value-added components and prestige 
goods domestically. Semiconductor manufacture was specifically named as a priority 
industry within the initiative, and between direct government funding, public-private 
partnerships, and university-led research, China’s total investment into semiconductor 
manufacturing R&D currently stands at 140 billion USD according to Credit Suisse.12  
 
Private hardware companies have advanced closer to the cutting edge of existing technology 
on the back of this R&D investment. In 2013, Lenovo greatly expanded its integrated circuit 
design team with an eye towards eventually substituting foreign processors with domestically 
manufactured ones, especially in the smartphone and tablet markets.13 On the other end of the 
computing spectrum, Lenovo has applied newfound knowledge and its manufacturing 
advantage to emerge at the forefront of the liquid cooling market for data centers, which 
could position the company to build more powerful supercomputers than can currently be 
made available for mainstream customers.14 As countries grow concerned about potential 
security concerns related to Chinese-sourced hardware,15 possibly diminishing international 
trade in the sector, thorough vertical domestic integration of Chinese hardware manufacturing 
could prove critical for the sector’s continued success. 
Federal Policies and Initiatives to Promote ICT-led Growth and 
Development 
 











An expansive and reliable infrastructure network is critical to the success of ICT-driven 
development. In order for mobile technology to effectively facilitate communication and the 
exchange of large quantities of information across large distances, customers must have 
access to high-speed data networks that offer consistent connection speeds even in remote 
areas. In a similar fashion, broadband internet connectivity is critical to the success of both 
commercial and non-commercial applications of ICT. More basic investments in 
infrastructure are required before modern ICT can even function properly. For example, 
applications of digital or communications technology intended to form the backbone of 
development interventions are not feasible in localities without sufficient or dependable 
access to electricity. While basic infrastructure is in place across India and China to promote 
the adoption of information and communications technology, the best way to measure the 











In China, booming investments in multiple areas of infrastructure over the past two decades 
have been one of the primary engines of the country’s exponential economic growth. These 
investments have both directly funded the expansion of communications infrastructure and 
have promoted the wealth generation that has encouraged a larger share of the Chinese 
population to adopt and benefit from ICT. The results have been astounding. In 2001, a mere 
2.64% of the population regularly used the internet. Between 2006 and 2009, this rate nearly 
tripled from 10.52% to 28.90%, before almost doubling again to 53.20% by 2016, the most 
recent year with available data. 
 
Mobile cellular subscriptions experienced a similar explosion. In 2001, China had under 150 
million mobile subscriptions. With robust investment first in basic wireless networks, and 
then in GPRS-enabled mobile networks, mobile subscriptions rose to nearly 400 million in 
2005, three quarters of a million in 2009, and one billion in 2011. 1.365 billion subscriptions 
were active in 2016, virtually equivalent to one for every man, woman and child in the 
country. China Mobile now hosts the world’s most expansive LTE network, and China is 
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now leading the world in the race to introduce a nationwide 5G network, having outspent the 
US by 24 billion USD since 2015.16 
 
Broadband internet has been the latest to benefit from the Chinese government’s 
infrastructure investments. Chinese broadband subscriptions stood at just a third of a million 
in 2001, before increasing by over a hundred-fold to 37 million in 2005. Since then, 
subscriptions have again increased by almost ten-fold to 323 million in 2016, roughly a 12% 
growth rate. With continuing to “build up bases of modern information-intensive 
infrastructure” identified as a priority goal in the 13th 5-year plan of 2016, China’s high levels 
of investment in ICT-related infrastructure seems set to continue. 
 
 Telecom sector reform in China 
 
Much of this growth in usage is also attributable to a series of reforms in China’s 
telecommunications sector. Until relatively recently, the Chinese telecommunications sector 
was the province of direct central government control, resulting in many of the same 
inefficiencies as those that had plagued the country’s planned economy over the thirty years 
following the establishment of the PRC. However, reforms in the sector have not only made 
wireless communications cheaply and easily accessible for the general population, they have 
allowed cellular technology to become the backbone of China’s newly emerging mobile 
economy. 
 
Prior to 1980, telecommunications were under direct control of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. Although prices under state control were fixed, this planned approach 
did not efficiently communicate service provision needs to the government, resulting in poor, 
scattered coverage across the country. The sector underwent reform through 1993, as prices 
were deregulated and management of telecom service was devolved to local government. 
Still, however, telecom service remained extremely rare and expensive. A cellular phone, for 
example, cost roughly 3000 USD before factoring in service charges. 
 
In 1994, the China United Telecommunications Corporation was founded, breaking a 
duopoly in the telecommunications market that had stifled innovation and competition. 
Further institutional and industrial restructuring continued through 1998, as government 
withdrew from direct management of state-owned enterprises, more companies were 
incentivized to enter the market, and competition in the sector increased. By June 2001, seven 
licensed public telecom operators were on the market. The market has since stabilized and 
consolidated somewhat, with China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom remaining as 
the country’s three largest mobile providers. 
  








India has not kept pace with China regarding adoption of information technology, but its 
rapid rate of cellular adoption has allowed the country to remain positioned for the upcoming 
digital revolution. The early adoption of mobile communications technology presaged the 
ongoing and widespread adoption of information technology by the general population. 
Internet usage has now entered a period of exponential growth, and while levels of broadband 
connectivity remain low, they have steadily risen over the past fifteen years. 
 
In 2001, India had a mere 6.5 million mobile subscriptions. By 2006, though, India had 
reached 166 million subscriptions, slightly more than China had had five years prior. Annual 
subscription growth did not drop below 40% until 2011, and by 2015, subscriptions crossed 
the one billion mark. As of 2016, 1.13 billion mobile subscriptions were active in India, 
slightly less than one subscription per person in the country. Since 2016, new private 
initiatives have been introduced to make mobile data service affordable and accessible to 
even more than before. Chief among these is Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Jio service, a 20 
billion USD investment promising to bring 4G service to 90% of the population for roughly 2 
USD/month.  
 
Making the internet reliably available over wireless networks will be key to accelerating 
India’s lagging rate of internet adoption, due to the limited availability of fixed digital 
infrastructure attested to by the low number of fixed broadband subscriptions in the country. 
India did not reach one million broadband subscriptions until 2005, after having only 50,000 
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in 2001. By 2010, 10 million subscriptions were active, and 18.6 million subscribers were 
online in 2016. But despite steady year-on-year growth, the baseline of broadband 
infrastructure has been too low for this growth to make a meaningful dent in India’s overall 
internet usage. More likely, these broadband subscribers are individuals in urban areas who 
are upgrading from their prior reliance on wireless networks rather than new users. 
 
India still has a long way to go before the whole population is capable of reliably connecting 
to the internet and meaningfully participating in the new digital economy. Through the end of 
2008, internet usage languished at under 5% of the population, before reaching 10% in 2011 
and 20% in 2014. Internet usage stood at just under 30% in 2016, with mobile connections 
providing the vast majority of this access. Furthermore, these wireless networks have a 
reputation for slow and patchy access, especially in poor and underserved areas. According to 
Hutokshi Doctor, director of the Centre for Communication and Development Studies 
(CCDS), slum-dwellers “often have to trek down the hill [and] come down to the main road 
to access the network.”17 Finally, a substantial rural-urban divide exists in mobile phone 
ownership, with 71% urban penetration compared to 55% rural penetration in 2018.18 
Artificial Intelligence 
In the same way that electricity fueled the second Industrial Revolution, and the internet 
helped create the modern digitally-enabled economies we see today, artificial intelligence has 
the capacity to become the world’s next general purpose technology (GPT). GPTs can be 
implemented to improve processes in virtually every sector, and so they are capable of 
revolutionizing virtually every sector. Prior GPTs made employees vastly more capable by 
augmenting their physical and mental capacity to complete work, either by taking over 
physical tasks or by making information for mental tasks more easily processed or accessible. 
AI stands apart from prior GPTs because it could eventually not just complement human 
labor, but substitute for it altogether. AI is already quite capable of performing and 
autonomously managing regular and predictable tasks such as warehousing, cataloguing, and 
assembly. As the technology evolves over the next decades, and AI increasingly takes over 
“human” tasks like logical reasoning, creativity in design, and business management, 
businesses and policymakers will need to adapt to a future of work in which some old jobs 
become obsolete, others have drastically redefined roles, and a crop of new jobs aimed at 
supporting AI analytics emerges. As early as 2022, 46% of the current workforce will be 
engaged in jobs that do not yet exist or have radically changed skillsets. 
 
With dropping costs of computing power and data storage, using AI at broader scales has 
become significantly more viable in recent years. AI globally is anticipated to grow at a rate 
of 50.1% annually through 2021, reaching 57.6 billion USD. This explosive growth rate is 
further augmented by the increasing digitization of all types of data, which has made training 
data for AI models more readily available and taken advantage of. 
 
To prepare for this revolution, India and China have taken sharply different approaches 
toward implementing AI in their growth and development strategies. Among the strategies 
these countries have used to create beneficial ecosystems for AI development have been 
infrastructure improvements like “data trusts,” connectivity infrastructure, and common 
computing facilities; fiscal incentives; and public-private coordination through technology 
parks, government facilitation, and “national teams” involving large private actors in 





fundamental and applied research. These varying approaches hold implications for their 




Until this point, commercial implications have served as the greatest determinant for AI 
adoption by an industry. In India, manufacturing has led the way so far; according to a BCG 
study, India’s manufacturing sector has the third highest AI implementation in the world, 
with 19% of companies already using AI to a significant extent, and a full 96% plan to adopt 
AI within the next three years.19 Banking has also been a leading sector, with virtual 
customer assistance, chatbots, and robo-advisory clients as initial examples of AI 
implementation in the space. In contrast, healthcare, education, and agriculture, three of the 
sectors targeted in ICT-driven development, have fallen noticeably behind. Outside 
investment and private sector initiatives like that of the Robert Bosch Centre for Data Science 
and Artificial Intelligence (RBC-DSAI) have heightened this inequality between sectors by 
focusing funding on applied research in areas succeeding in AI adoption. Besides commercial 
viability, additional factors holding back some sectors while boosting others have included 
technical feasibility, structured data availability, regulatory barriers, privacy considerations, 
ethical issues, and preferences for human interaction. 
 
“Business as Usual” trajectories for AI implementation in several global sectors. Adapted 
from National AI Strategy Discussion Paper.20 
 





India’s national AI strategy, formulated by NITI Aayog, seeks to transform India into a leader 
in global AI by following a three-pronged approach under the headline #AIforAll, outlined 
below: 
1. Opportunity for Economic Impact: Accenture estimates that if implemented 
throughout the whole economy, AI has the potential to boost India’s annual growth 
rate by 1.3%. By 2035, this would add 1 trillion USD to the economy. This guideline 
calls for a modification of the existing market-driven approach more thoroughly 
inclusive of lagging industries so as to reap the greatest benefit of AI as a GPT 
throughout the economy. 
 
2. AI for the Greater Good: the strategy seeks to optimize implementation of AI not 
around maximization of topline growth, but around the achievement of social goals. 
In this respect, recent advances in AI are ideally suited to working around challenges 
that have made these social problems remain salient. Geographical access barriers, 
financial exclusion, limited and asymmetrical market information, and the demands of 
urbanization all have potential AI-enabled solutions that can support quality of life, 
access to choice, and inclusive growth aligned with development priorities. 
 
3. AI Garage for 40% of the World: India already serves as the source of IT solutions for 
much of the world, and AI is a simple extension of this existing competence. India’s 
vast scale and complex development challenges lend it a natural advantage for large-
scale piloting, testing, and implementation of scalable technology solutions to issues 
that implicate the rest of the developing world. At the same time, India’s existing 
track record as an IT and services hub gives it a leg up on providing Artificial 
Intelligence as a Service (AiaaS). Finally, India’s great diversity will aid in 
developing robust AI solutions adaptable to highly variable environments, whether 
different in language or landscape. These three forces have the potential to elevate 
India as the solution provider of choice for emerging and developing economies 
across the globe. 
 
Government coordination is a prerequisite to reorienting AI development around social 
goals because so far, private efforts have failed to direct investment towards sectors with 
the greatest potential for externalities. As an example, agriculture has struggled to gain 
investment for AI implementation because it would require coordination between many 
stakeholders and technological interventions at many levels, while private sector actors 
have not invested optimally because existing challenges and constraints have resulted in 
collective action problems. 
 
For these sectors central to ICT-driven development, government intervention can “crowd 
in” investment by providing infrastructure access, supporting innovation through 
research, catalyzing partnerships between supporting firms, and generating demand for AI 
and ICT solutions to government needs. In agriculture, a potential way to activate the 
private sector would be developing a government-sponsored AI marketplace focusing on 
data collection, aggregation, and price modeling both for goods and agricultural services. 
With time, such a marketplace could develop both a supply and demand for AI services 
and would help identify the pricing metrics other private companies would need to 
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introduce their own platforms. Government coordination would also help India adapt to 
the future of work by supporting the development of new certification programs 
cognizant of affordability and access constraints, especially decentralized teaching in 
collaboration with the private sector. 
 
Finally, ethical data usage and data protection have recently become topics of 
consternation in India, especially following the Supreme Court’s ruling placing limits on 
the Aadhaar program over privacy concerns. At the same time, abundant and easily 
accessible data is a key ingredient in the development of successful AI responsive to the 
societal challenges it is designed to help resolve. To reconcile these competing goals, 
NITI-Aayog proposes the introduction of a new ethics framework surrounding data 
fairness, accountability, and transparency, incorporating data protection practices along 
international standards. A new, less narrow and stringent IP regime would also be 
introduced to bridge the gap between protecting innovation and encouraging 
collaboration, by, for example, making data easily available for developing new models 
while providing legal protection to finished products. New training for IP granting 
authorities and the judiciary would be required to close the gap in needs between AI 
developers and practitioners. 
 
India’s overall approach to AI, and ICT-driven development more broadly, can be 
summed up as pursuing a late-mover advantage. The government is quite cognizant of 
human capital limitations, and NITI Aayog’s AI strategy paper acknowledges that the 
domestic technology sector is not yet prepared for cutting-edge research and applications 
of groundbreaking, homegrown ICT innovations. However, India can leapfrog ahead in 
its digital development by learning from successes and best practices around the world, 
while building domestic R&D capacity and biding its time until the sector becomes 
reasonably competitive. India’s major tech companies, which are already structured as 
“systems integrators” which deliver technological solutions based on common practice 
rather than proprietary knowledge, are well suited for such an approach. Strategic public-
private partnerships with these companies will allow them to focus their expertise in 
adapting existing solutions on India’s development challenges, and eventually the rest of 
the world’s.21 
 
As far as AI is concerned, the report proposes introducing a Centre of Research 
Excellence (CORE), for improving understanding of core research, and an International 
Centre for Transformational AI (ICTAI), which would develop and deploy applied 
research in collaboration with the private sector. The former of these would build India’s 
innovation capacity in preparation for competing at the international level, while the latter 
would build a market for the applications that could position India at the center of global 




ICT services are already a major driver in the Chinese economy, and current investments 
indicate that Beijing sees AI as the next frontier in its socioeconomic development. By 2030, 
China estimates that 26% of its GDP will come from AI-related activities, and significant 
public spending has already been reserved for AI research via the central government, top-tier 
universities, and extensive public-private research partnerships. This publicly-funded 
                                                        
21 https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/17/indias-sleeping-tech-giants-are-about-to-awaken/ 
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research would strengthen a sector which has already saturated China with private sector 
investment and startups in areas like AI-powered fintech, chatbots, and AI-taught language 
learning.22 
 
The Next Generation AI Development Plan, a strategic document published by the State 
Council in July 2017, outlines a roadmap towards another generation of rapid economic 
growth in China. In contrast with recent history, however, this plan envisions China 
transitioning from extensive, “catch-up” growth to intensive, innovation-driven growth. AI is 
seen as the keystone of this strategy, which builds a case for expanding China’s theoretical 
development capacity, establishing a technological edge over other countries, and eventually 
leading the world in intelligent future technology development. 
 
In contrast with India’s “late-mover” strategy, which seeks to capitalize on earlier 
breakthroughs, adapt them to indigenous challenges and leapfrog to a point of 
competitiveness, China seeks to “pursue a first-mover advantage to become the world’s 
primary innovation center by 2030.” By being the first country to base development around 
Artificial Intelligence, China intends to gain a significant enough early technological edge to 
establish itself as the world leader in AI. This would allow industry clustering centered 
around Chinese AI companies to ensue, making the country a lasting, permanent leader in the 
space. The national AI strategy, and the “Made in China 2025” initiative more broadly, seeks 
to replicate the early successes that allowed America, a first mover in the early stages of the 
digital revolution, to assume its current role as a global hub of tech innovation. 
 
To improve the likelihood of stimulating technological breakthroughs that could spark this 
transition, China has prioritized research in areas of “paradigmatic change,” or fields of AI 
with high interpretative and generalization capabilities, high potential for interdisciplinary 
convergence, or clear applied objectives with the possibility of triggering AI technological 
upgrades. China also plans to focus its investment on sectors that have achieved the highest 
commercial viability. The first purpose of this is to drive the market-dominant 
commercialization of AI technology, leading to widespread adoption and usage. Second, this 
approach would intensify research in the best understood fields of AI, increasing the 
probability of breakthroughs in theoretical understanding.  
 
Developing a theoretical research advantage over the rest of the world requires vast 
investments of human and financial resources. To build the necessary human capital early on, 
China plans to gather leading foreign talent through its “thousand talents program,” which 
invites researchers to work in China. Domestic talent would be cultivated by introducing an 
AI academic discipline and integrating AI into professional training in all relevant fields. The 
strategy also calls on Chinese companies to leverage “international innovation resources”  by 
“going out,” or engaging in foreign mergers and acquisitions, equity investments, and venture 
capital for the purposes of reaping the benefits of foreign innovations. Over time, these 
efforts should reduce the current supply gap in domestic AI talent attested to by the 
aggressive efforts of Chinese tech companies to recruit leading talent abroad.23 
 







The problem of financial resources will be addressed by introducing national AI “mass 
innovation bases,” bringing together industry, academia, research, and production facilities in 
open-source entrepreneurship incubation platforms. The strategy envisions this type of deep 
integration between innovation ecosystems and industrial chains to allow more coordinated 
support platforms to emerge as well, such as common computing facilities and big data 
infrastructure. 
 
However, China does not envision an entirely market-driven AI innovation ecosystem 
because its national strategy also places a high premium on preserving stability. The 
document places an emphasis on “safe, reliable and controllable AI development” which 
minimizes social risks while supporting applications in public security, national defense, and 
even the judicial system. On the one hand, the emphasis on social stability encourages a 
strong focus on establishing lifelong employment training systems to smoothly transition 
workers into AI-supporting roles. In other words, China intends to adapt to the future of work 
by preparing its workforce for shifting roles, responsibilities and knowledge requirements. 
On the other hand, the overwhelming focus on maintaining stability leads to a heavy focus on 
developing AI security and evaluation systems, coordinating military and civilian innovation 
resources, and integrating AI into the burgeoning social credit system. The fear of unfettered 
development means that the strategy envisions an investment system that, although market 
dominated, is “guided” by the financial administration. Substantively, this system does not 
differ greatly from the state capitalism which currently defines China’s economy. 
Key Issues/Challenges to Promote ICT-led Growth and 
Development in India 
 
Lack of strategic federal initiatives and local capacity 
 
At this point, India’s national government has not fully assumed its necessary role as a 
catalyst in bringing together actors from the technology, financial, social, philanthropic and 
public sectors to create a national vision, motivation, and funding program for ICT-driven 
development. The only significant government initiative launched so far has been 2015’s 
Digital India campaign, which sought to partner with these stakeholders to empower the 
technology sector and make government services available electronically through improved 
online infrastructure and increased internet connectivity. 
 
While federal initiative lacks for fostering the development of national platforms for ICT-
driven development, particularly for the benefit of rural areas, these platforms are further 
undermined by states’ lack of capacity to use them. The EkStep platform, for example, is a 
free-to-use and complete platform meant to improve learning opportunities for primary-age 
children. But with limited federal promotion and cooperation with state and local authorities, 
adoption of the program has remained limited so far. Platforms to support both India’s 
nascent national insurance system and its health and wellness centers initiative are likewise in 
early stages of development. While recent strategy papers have acknowledged both of these 
needs, the central government has not yet prioritized the implementation of these 
recommendations. 
 
Societal limitations on internet access 
 
Insufficient infrastructure and cost considerations are not the only barriers to internet access, 
especially for India’s rural population. India also has one of the largest gender gaps for 
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internet usage in the world. In 2016, 70% of internet users were men, compared to only 30% 
of women. By 2020, these proportions are forecast to drop to 60% and 40% respectively, but 
this discrepancy will remain.  According to a 2018 study by the regional ICT policy think 
tank LIRNEAsia, this gendered digital inequality is rooted in disparities in education, 
income, and awareness about mobile technology between men and women.  A 2015 CCDS 
study found that with many women expected to stay at home, and lacking control over their 
own finances, they had no means to independently use the internet. In addition, when they 
were able to use the internet, many women were also monitored by close family members, 
and a heavy stigma was attached to women in poor communities using mobile phones 
coupled with a fear that the internet would cause women to go astray and be exploited.  
Without fully engaging half of its population, India will struggle to raise its digital adoption 
beyond its current level. 
 
Lack of enhanced research capacity 
 
India has succeeded so far in developing a digitally-capable workforce responsive to the 
demands of a global economy. But this success will prove somewhat illusory once India 
confronts the higher technical demands of innovating and applying AI and cutting-edge ICT 
solutions. The country will face shortages in and inconsistency of skilled expertise as it works 
towards becoming a leader in these fields, while issues of access and affordability will 
hamper efforts to fill these gaps. 
 
While India may not yet be ready to direct cutting-edge research, the country plans to 
organize enhanced AI research efforts around maximizing a late mover advantage, leap-
frogging in technical development by learning from successes and failures around the world, 
adapting existing technology to India’s most pressing needs, and simultaneously building 
R&D capacity for future competitiveness. The AI Strategy Discussion Paper proposes two 
institutions for this: a Center of Research Excellence (CORE), which would consolidate 
understanding of existing core research and generate new knowledge to enable technological 
breakthroughs, and an International Center of Transformational AI (ICTAI), which would 
develop and deploy applied research targeted toward private sector collaboration. These two 
bodies would operate under an umbrella organization directing research efforts according to 
analysis of global advances in AI technology, analysis of socio-economic needs, and potential 
for collaboration on the international level. 
Key Issues/Challenges to Promote ICT-led Growth and 
Development in China 
 
Exclusive Market-Driven Focus 
 
Part of China’s planned first-mover approach to an ICT-powered economy is the need to 
concentrate resource investments of all types in sectors that have already found success. 
Fields that have proven themselves as solid investments will attract more capital than sectors 
which have lagged behind, increasing the likelihood of theoretical technological 
breakthroughs in these sectors and eventually, technological dominance. However, the 
sectors at the center of ICT-driven development are precisely those which have not yet 
succeed in incorporating ICT. This reveals the need for public investments to allow the 
potential positive externalities from success in these sectors to take effect. But under China’s 
current ICT strategy, such public investment in laggard sectors is unlikely. 
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Tension Between Stability and Innovation Priorities 
 
China’s first-mover approach also puts a heavy premium on encouraging innovation. Yet 
national strategies also voice a need to ensure that AI innovations both do not disrupt China’s 
social stability and do contribute to solving the country’s many social challenges. AI is an 
inherently disruptive technology, and in the early stages of development, when ethical, 
regulatory, and security frameworks are not fully evolved, it is unlikely that the cutting-edge 
innovation desired will not disrupt social stability. To China’s credit, it anticipates the need to 
rapidly develop such frameworks. But the practices initially included in them will likely not 
anticipate the new, unforeseen challenges inherent in unproven technologies. 
 
Lack of Proven Intensive Innovation Capacity 
 
China’s AI and ICT development plans hinge on an ability to produce world-class research at 
the bleeding edge of existing technology. This stands in contrast to China’s existing 
development in the ICT space, which although innovative in its applications, builds on 
technology and knowledge already applied throughout the developed world. In order to 
become the first mover in ICT innovations, China must find world-leading research talent in 
the short term while developing the capacity to produce the same level of talent in the long 
term. The evidence indicates it has not yet done so. The Mercator Institute predicts that the 
Made in China 2025 Initiative may produce a few international champions, but will fail to 
“catalyze a comprehensive, broad-scale technology upgrading across the Chinese economy.” 
And the founding director of Baidu’s Institute of Deep Learning, Yu Kai, estimates the 
number of world-leading AI researchers in China at “between five and ten.”24 The plan does 
acknowledge these challenges, but has not formulated specific paths to overcoming them.  
 
Reduced Space for Local Policy Experimentation under Xi 
 
Under prior CCP premierships, local and provincial governments worked as low-stakes 
laboratories of policymaking in which different interventions could be tested out, assessed, 
and deployed nationally if successful. This “adaptive authoritarianism” succeeded because a 
collective leadership model, instituted under Deng Xiaoping to limit the excesses of the Mao 
era, succeeded in fostering a spirit of internal debate, honest internal reporting, and relative 
meritocracy within the party. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of personal power has altered this 
dynamic. With Xi’s assumption of direct control over a far larger share of government than 
his predecessors, officials’ priorities have shifted “from showing results to showing loyalty,” 
and bureaucrats have become more passive and less willing to take initiative without explicit 
orders from higher up.25  
 






At the local and state level, this has discouraged policy experimentation at the very levels of 
government responsibie both for China’s innovative governance and lack of centrally planned 
excesses in the recent past. Furthermore, the government has begun discouraging small-scale 
pilot programs in favor of policies enacted at the national level. Refusal to devolve power in 
part has caused provincial-level policy pilots to drop from 500 in 2010 to 70 in 2016, as 
reduced perceived reward and heightened career risk leads officials to let experimental 
reforms fall by the wayside. On top of this, secrecy around ongoing pilots has been 
heightened out of fear of negative publicity if they fail. This reduces space for civil society 
participation and using prior mistakes to inform future interventions.26 In this newly 
repressive policy environment, leading applied research will not be the only field to suffer; 
introducing even widely proven ICT platforms and other innovative tools will fail, especially 
in low-stakes and underserved areas, unless the government is certain both of their complete 
success and their ability to mitigate all possible risks. Such risk aversion does not bode well 
for China’s growth into a leader in ICT-driven development. 
 
                                                        
26 https://www.economist.com/china/2018/08/18/local-experiments-with-reform-are-becoming-rarer-
under-xi-jinping 
